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We study the optimal provision of unemployment insurance (UI) over the business cycle. We use
an equilibrium search and matching model with aggregate shocks to labor productivity, incorporating
risk-averse workers, endogenous worker search eort decisions, and unemployment benet expiration.
We characterize the optimal UI policy, allowing both the benet level and benet duration to depend
on the history of past aggregate shocks. We nd that the optimal benet is decreasing in current
productivity and decreasing in current unemployment. Following a drop in productivity, benets
initially rise in order to provide short-run relief to the unemployed and stabilize wages, but then fall
signicantly below their pre-recession level, in order to speed up the subsequent recovery. Under
the optimal policy, the path of benets is pro-cyclical overall. As compared to the existing US UI
system, the optimal history-dependent benets smooth cyclical uctuations in unemployment and
deliver substantial welfare gains.
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11 Introduction
The unemployment insurance (UI) systems in the US and many other countries contain provisions for
extending unemployment benets in response to economic downturns. The optimality of such extensions
is the subject of an ongoing debate. The recent recession has further intensied the discussion of
this important policy issue. Unemployment benets provide insurance to workers against heightened
unemployment risk. However, they may distort worker search decisions as well as rms' hiring decisions,
possibly exacerbating the negative eects of an adverse economic shock. In this paper, we use a general
equilibrium search model to characterize optimal UI policy over the business cycle.
We study UI provision in a Pissarides model with risk-averse workers and aggregate shocks to labor
productivity. Our approach has three key features. First, we use a general equilibrium model, which
enables us to capture the eects of policy changes on both rms' vacancy creation and worker search
behavior. Second, we allow unemployment benets to expire. This enables us to study the optimal
choice of benet duration as well as benet level and to characterize the optimal behavior of both
policy dimensions over the business cycle. Third, we allow the benet policy to depend not only on the
current aggregate state but also on its past history. This is important, since the social costs and benets
of providing job creation incentives in the current period depend on both current and past economic
conditions.
Formally, we consider the optimal policy choice of a benevolent, utilitarian government that can
choose both the level and the duration of unemployment benets. The government can change the
benet level and duration in response to aggregate conditions and run decits in some states of nature,
as long as it balances its budget on average. We solve for the optimal state-contingent UI policy and nd
that it prescribes for the benet level and duration to rise immediately following a drop in productivity.
Subsequently, however, it prescribes a persistent decline in benet levels and duration below their pre-
recession values. The optimal response of benets to a negative shock is thus non-monotonic. Right
after a negative productivity shock hits, the social returns to job creation are low, so the government is
2more concerned with providing short-term relief for the unemployed and slowing the decline of wages
than with inducing high job nding. Therefore, it temporarily raises the generosity of benets - both
level and duration - triggering a decrease in both vacancy creation and worker search eort. However,
since the shock is mean-reverting, the government expects an economic recovery and subsequently lowers
benets and shortens their duration to stimulate job nding.
Central to this result is our nding that, all else equal, the optimal benet level and duration are
decreasing in current productivity and decreasing in current unemployment. In low-productivity states,
the social benets of creating additional worker-rm matches are relatively low, and so the government
optimally raises the generosity of UI benets. In high-unemployment states, however, the social benets
of raising employment are relatively high, and so the government optimally lowers the generosity of UI
benets. This suggests that, in a recession, there are two opposing forces - low productivity and high
unemployment - which give opposite prescriptions for the behavior of optimal benets. We nd that
the rst eect is stronger at the very beginning of a recession, but the second eect dominates as the
recession progresses, and inducing a recovery becomes desirable. As a consequence, we nd that the
time path of optimal benet levels and benet duration is pro-cyclical overall.
1.1 Relationship to the previous literature on unemployment insurance
The literature on the design of optimal UI policy has emphasized two key tradeos. The rst is the
tradeo between providing insurance against unemployment risk and providing job search incentives to
unemployed workers. This tradeo has been extensively analyzed in principal-agent models of optimal
UI, starting with Baily (1978), Shavell and Weiss (1979), Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997), and Shimer
and Werning (2008). The second tradeo is the tradeo between insurance and providing rms with
incentives for vacancy creation. This tradeo has been emphasized by Fredriksson and Holmlund (2001),
Cahuc and Lehmann (2000), Coles and Masters (2006), and Lehmann and van der Linden (2007), who
study optimal UI design in equilibrium models with endogenous job creation and wage bargaining. Our
framework incorporates the tradeos from both literatures. Moreover, it introduces aggregate shocks
3into such optimal policy analysis and quantitatively characterizes the optimal policy.
The paper closest to ours is Landais, Michaillat, and Saez (2010), who also examine optimal UI policy
over the business cycle. Unlike our paper, they nd that optimal UI benets should be countercyclical.
There are important dierences between the assumptions of their paper and ours. The key dierence is
that, while we assume that wages are determined by bargaining, Landais, Michaillat, and Saez (2010)
assume an extreme form of wage rigidity, namely that wages are a reduced-form function of labor
productivity. In section 6.1 we elaborate on this dierence in assumptions and discuss its importance
for the dierence in results.
Several other recent studies (Kiley (2003) , Sanchez (2008), Andersen and Svarer (2010, 2011), Kroft
and Notowidigdo (2010)) have examined the optimal design of a state-contingent policy.1 Our results
that optimal benets respond non-monotonically to a productivity shock, and that the optimal path of
benets is pro-cyclical, are new to this literature. Furthermore, introducing optimal benet duration
into this literature is particularly important, since the current debate on the optimality of UI benet
extensions has focused almost entirely on the duration of benets. To our knowledge, our paper is the
rst to incorporate both policy dimensions in the context of optimal UI provision over the business
cycle.
The paper is organized as follows. We present the model in section 2. Section 3 describes the
optimal policy. We describe how we calibrate the model to US data in section 4. We report our results




We consider an innite-horizon discrete-time model. The economy is populated by a unit measure of
workers and a larger continuum of rms.
1Another strand of the recent literature examines the eect of the recent unemployment benet extensions on the
unemployment rate. See e.g. Fujita (2010), Nakajima (2011), Valletta and Kuang (2010).
4Agents. In any given period, a worker can be either employed (matched with a rm) or unemployed.




t [u(xt)   c(st)];
where E0 is the period-0 expectation operator,  2 (0;1) is the discount factor, xt denotes consumption
in period t, and st denotes search eort exerted in period t if unemployed. Only unemployed workers can
supply search eort: there is no on-the-job search. The within-period utility of consumption u : R+ ! R
is twice dierentiable, strictly increasing, strictly concave, and satises u0(0) = 1. The cost of search
eort for unemployed workers c : [0;1] ! R is twice dierentiable, strictly increasing, strictly convex,
and satises c0 (0) = 0, c0 (1) = 1. An unemployed worker produces h units of the consumption good
via home production. There do not exist private insurance markets and workers cannot save or borrow.
Firms are risk-neutral and maximize prots. Workers and rms have the same discount factor . A
rm can be either matched to a worker or vacant. A rm posting a vacancy incurs a ow cost k.
Production. The economy is subject to aggregate shocks to labor productivity. Specically, a
matched worker-rm pair produces output zt, where zt is stochastic. We assume that lnzt follows
an AR(1) process
lnzt = lnzt 1 + ""t;
where 0   < 1, " > 0, and "t are independent and identically distributed standard normal random
variables. We will write zt = fz0;z1;:::;ztg to denote the history of shocks up to period t.
Matching. Job creation occurs through a matching function. The number of new matches in period
t equals
M (St (1   Lt 1);vt);
where 1   Lt 1 is the unemployment level in period t   1, St is the average search eort exerted by
unemployed workers in period t, and vt is the measure of vacancies posted in period t. The quantity
5Nt = St (1   Lt 1) represents the measure of eciency units of worker search.
The matching function M exhibits constant returns to scale, is strictly increasing and strictly concave
in both arguments, and has the property that the number of new matches cannot exceed the number
of potential matches: M (N;v)  minfN;vg 8N;v. We dene
t =
vt
St (1   Lt 1)
to be the market tightness in period t. We dene the functions
f () =
M (S (1   L);v)
S (1   L)
= M (1;) and
q () =








where f () is the job-nding probability per eciency unit of search and q () is the probability of
lling a vacancy. By the assumptions on M made above, the function f () is increasing in  and q ()
is decreasing in . For an individual worker exerting search eort s, the probability of nding a job is
sf (). When workers choose the amount of search eort s, they take as given the aggregate job-nding
probability f ().
Existing matches are exogenously destroyed with a constant job separation probability . Thus, any
of the Lt 1 workers employed in period t   1 has a probability  of becoming unemployed.
2.2 Government Policy
The US UI system is nanced by payroll taxes on rms and is administered at the state level. However,
under the provisions of the Social Security Act, each state can borrow from a federal unemployment
insurance trust fund, provided it meets certain federal requirements. Motivated by these features of the
UI system, we assume that the government in the model economy can insure against aggregate shocks
by buying and selling claims contingent on the aggregate state and is required to balance its budget
only in expectation. Further, we assume that the price of a claim to one unit of consumption in state
zt+1 after a history zt is equal to the probability of zt+1 conditional on zt; this would be the case, e.g.,
6in the presence of a large number of out-of state risk-neutral investors with the same discount factor.
Government policies are restricted to take the following form. The government levies a constant
lump sum tax  on rm prots and uses its tax revenues to nance unemployment benets. The
government is allowed to choose both the level of benets and the rate at which they expire. We assume
stochastic benet expiration. A benet policy at time t thus consists of a pair (bt;et), where bt  0 is
the level of benets provided to those workers who are eligible for benets at time t, and et 2 [0;1] is
the probability that an unemployed worker eligible for benets becomes ineligible the following period.
The eligibility status of a worker evolves as follows. A worker employed in period t is automatically
eligible for benets in case of job separation. An unemployed worker eligible for benets in period t
becomes ineligible the following period with probability et, and an ineligible worker does not regain
eligibility until he nds a job. All eligible workers receive the same benets bt; ineligible workers receive
no unemployment benets, but instead receive an exogenously given welfare payment p.
We allow the benet policy to depend on the entire history of past aggregate shocks; thus the






must be measurable with respect to zt. Benets are constrained to be
non-negative: the government cannot tax home production.
2.3 Timing
The government commits to a policy (;bt ();et ()) once and for all before the period-0 shock realizes.
Within each period t, the timing is as follows.
1. The economy enters period t with a level of employment Lt 1. Of the 1   Lt 1 unemployed
workers, a measure Dt 1  1   Lt 1 are eligible for benets, i.e. will receive benets in period t
if they do not nd a job.
2. The aggregate shock zt then realizes. Firms observe the aggregate shock and decide how many
vacancies to post, at cost k per vacancy. At the same time, workers choose their search eort st
at the cost of c(st). Letting SE
t and SI
t be the search eort exerted by an eligible unemployed
worker and an ineligible unemployed worker, respectively, the aggregate search eort is then equal
7to SE
t Dt 1 + SI




t Dt 1 + SI





t Dt 1 + SI
t (1   Lt 1   Dt 1)

unemployed workers nd jobs. At the same time, a fraction
 of the existing Lt 1 matches are exogenously destroyed.
4. All the workers who are now employed produce zt and receive a bargained wage wt (below we
describe wage determination in detail). Workers who (i) were employed and lost a job, or (ii) were
eligible unemployed workers and did not nd a job, consume home production plus unemploy-
ment benets, h + bt and lose their eligibility for the next period with probability et. Ineligible
unemployed workers who have not found a job consume home production plus public assistance,
h + p, and remain ineligible for the following period.
























































Thus, the measure of workers receiving benets in period t is Lt 1 + (1   stf (t))Dt 1 = Dt
1 et.
Since we assume that the government has access to nancial markets in which a full set of state-





















82.4 Worker Value Functions
A worker entering period t employed retains his job with probability 1   and loses it with probability
. If he retains his job, he consumes his wage wt
 
zt
and proceeds as employed to period t + 1. If he
loses his job, he consumes his home production plus benets, h + bt
 
zt
and proceeds as unemployed
to period t + 1. With probability 1   et
 
zt
he then retains his eligibility for benets in period t + 1,
and with probability et
 
zt
he loses his eligibility. Denote by Wt
 
zt
the value after a history zt for a
worker who enters period t employed.













and remains unemployed with the
complementary probability. If he nds a job, he earns the wage wt
 
zt
and proceeds as employed to




and proceeds as unemployed to the next period. With probability 1   et
 
zt
he retains his eligibility
for benets in period t + 1, and with probability et
 
zt





value after a history zt for a worker who enters period t as eligible unemployed.
Finally, a worker entering period t unemployed and ineligible for benets chooses search eort sI
t and











and remains unemployed with
the complementary probability. If he nds a job, he earns the wage wt
 
zt
and proceeds as employed
to period t + 1. If he remains unemployed, he consumes his home production plus welfare payments,




the value after a
history zt for a worker who enters period t as ineligible unemployed.


























































































































It will be useful to dene the worker's surplus from being employed. The surplus utility from being




















































2.5 Firm Value Functions
A matched rm retains its worker with probability 1 . In this case, the rm receives the output net of
wages and taxes, zt  wt
 
zt
 , and then proceeds into the next period as a matched rm. If the rm
loses its worker, it gains nothing in the current period and proceeds into the next period unmatched.






rm nds a worker, it gets ow prots zt   wt
 
zt
   and proceeds into the next period as a matched




the value of a rm that enters period t matched to a worker, and denote by Vt
 
zt














































= zt   wt
 
zt








We assume that wages are determined according to Nash bargaining: the wage is chosen to maximize
a weighted product of the worker's surplus and the rm's surplus. Further, the worker's outside option
is being unemployed and eligible for benets, since he becomes eligible upon locating an employer and










where  2 (0;1) is the worker's bargaining weight.
2.7 Equilibrium Given Policy
In this section, we dene the equilibrium of the model, taking as given a government policy (;bt ();et ())
and characterize it.
2.7.1 Equilibrium Denition
Taking as given an initial condition (z 1;L 1), we dene an equilibrium given policy:
Denition 1 Given a policy (;bt ();et ()) and an initial condition (z 1;L 1) an equilibrium is a
sequence of zt-measurable functions for wages wt
 
zt















, measures of eligible workers Dt
 
zt





























1. The value functions satisfy the worker and rm Bellman equations (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10),
(11), (12)
2. Optimal search: The search eort SE
t solves the maximization problem in (6) for sE
t , and the
search eort SI
t solves the maximization problem in (7) for sI
t
3. Free entry: The value Vt
 
zt
of a vacant rm is zero for all zt
4. Nash bargaining: The wage maximizes equation (13)
5. Law of motion for employment and eligibility status: Employment and the measure of eligible
unemployed workers satisfy (2) , (3)
6. Budget balance: Tax revenue and benets satisfy (4)
2.7.2 Characterization of Equilibrium
We characterize the equilibrium given policy via a system of equations that involves allocations only,
and does not involve the value functions. This will be helpful in computing the optimal policy.









































































1. The laws of motion (2) , (3)
122. The budget equation (4)












































































4. Modied rm Bellman equation
k
q (t)




5. Nash bargaining condition

























g satisfy (2)-(4) and (14)-(17), then






















































































Next, we rearrange the expressions for worker surpluses (8), (9) to get
t =u(wt)   u(h + bt)

















Now, substituting (18) and (20) into the left and right hand sides of (22) gives (14); similarly, substituting
(19) and (21) into the left and right hand sides of (23) gives (15).




of a rm posting a vacancy must be zero. Equations (10) and (11) then simplify to:
Jt = (1   )[zt   wt    + EtJt+1] (24)
0 =  k + q (t)[zt   wt    + EtJt+1] (25)
which together imply








Equations (24) and (26) imply that  t follows the law of motion  t = zt   wt    +  (1   )Et t+1,
which, by (27), is precisely (16).
14Finally, the rst-order condition with respect to wt for the Nash bargaining problem (13) is
u0 (wt) t = (1   )t (28)
Substituting (27) and (18) into (28) and using the fact that f () = q () yields (17).
The converse of the result holds since the value functions can be recovered via the corresponding Bellman
equations.
The conditions (14)-(17) are straightforward to interpret. Equations (14) and (15) state that the
marginal cost of increasing the job nding probability for the eligible and ineligible workers, respectively,
equals the marginal benet. The marginal cost (left-hand side of each equation) of increasing the job
nding probability is the marginal disutility of search for that worker weighted by the aggregate job
nding rate. The marginal benet (right-hand side of each equation) equals the current consumption
gain from becoming employed plus the benet of economizing on search costs in the future. Equation
(16) gives a similar optimality condition for rms: it equates the marginal cost of creating a vacancy,
weighted by the probability of lling that vacancy, to the benet of employing a worker. Finally, (17) is
a restatement of the rst-order condition of the bargaining problem. It will be clear in section 3 that the
conditions (14)-(17) will play the role of incentive constraints in the optimal policy problem, analogous
to incentive constraints in principal-agent models of unemployment insurance, e.g. Hopenhayn and
Nicolini (1997).
3 Optimal Policy
We assume that the government is utilitarian: it chooses a policy to maximize the period-0 expected
value of worker utility, taking the equilibrium conditions as constraints.



























g such that (2), (3), (14)-(17) hold for all zt, and the
government budget constraint (4) is satised.






































































over the set of all feasible policies.



























g to maximize (29) subject to (2), (3),
(14)-(17) holding for all zt, and subject to the government budget constraint (4). We nd the optimal
policy by solving the system of necessary rst-order conditions for this problem. The period-t solution
will naturally be state-dependent: in particular, it will depend on the current productivity zt, as well
as the current unemployment level 1   Lt 1, and current measure of benet-eligible workers Dt 1
with which the economy has entered period t. However, in general the triple (zt;1   Lt 1;Dt 1) is
not a sucient state variable for pinning down the optimal policy, which may depend on the entire
past history of aggregate shocks. In the appendix, we show that the optimal period t solution is a
function of (zt;1   Lt 1;Dt 1) as well as (et 1;t 1;t 1;t 1), where et 1 is the previous period's
benet expiration rate and t 1;t 1;t 1 are Lagrange multipliers on the constraints (14),(15),(16),
respectively, in the maximization problem (29). The tuple (zt;1   Lt 1;Dt 1;et 1;t 1;t 1;t 1)
captures the dependence of the optimal bt;et on the history zt. The fact that the zt, 1   Lt 1 and
Dt 1 are not sucient reects the fact that the optimal policy is time-inconsistent: for example, the
optimal benets after two dierent histories of shocks may dier even though the two histories result in
the same current productivity and the same current unemployment level. Intuitively, the government
might want to induce rms to post vacancies - and workers to search - by promising low unemployment
benets, but has an ex post incentive to provide higher benets, so as to smooth worker consumption,
after employment outcomes have realized. Including the variables et 1;t 1;t 1;t 1 as state variables
in the optimal policy captures exactly this trade-o. Note that we assume throughout the paper that
the government can fully commit to its policy. In the appendix we explain the method used to solve for
16the optimal policy.
4 Calibration
We calibrate the model to verify that it captures salient features of the US labor market, and is thus a
useful one for studying optimal policy design. Unlike previous versions of the Pissarides model calibrated
in the literature, e.g. Shimer (2005) and Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008), our model incorporates
endogenous search intensity choices and stochastic benet expiration. Moreover, the market tightness
in our model is not equal to the vacancy-unemployment ratio; rather, it is the object dened in (1),
which we do not directly observe in the data. Our calibration strategy will be correspondingly modied
relative to the previous literature. As explained below, we will calibrate the model to ensure that it
is consistent both with aggregate US labor market data and with results from micro studies on the
responsiveness of unemployment duration to benet generosity.
We normalize mean productivity to one. We assume a benet scheme that mimics the benet
extension provisions currently in place within the US policy. The standard benet duration is 26 weeks;
local and federal employment conditions trigger automatic 20-week and 33-week extensions. In the
model we assume that et = 1=59 when productivity is below two standard deviations below the mean,
et = 1=46 when productivity is between one and two standard deviations below the mean, and et = 1=26
otherwise. We set the welfare payment p = 0:05 to match the amount of Food Stamp payments as a
fraction of average weekly earnings.2 We pick the tax rate  = 0:023 so that the government balances
its budget if the unemployment rate is 5.5%.
We assume log utility: u(x) = lnx. For the cost of search, we assume the functional form
c(s) =
A
1 +  
h
(1   s)
 (1+ )   1
i
  As (30)
This functional form satises all the assumptions made on the search cost function; in particular, it
implies that the optimal search eort will always be between 0 and 1 for any A > 0.
2See the US Department of Health and Human Services (2008) Annual Report.
17For the matching function, we follow den Haan, Ramey, and Watson (2000) and pick
M (N;v) =
Nv
[N  + v]
1=
This matching technology satises all the assumptions made earlier, in particular the assumption that









The model period is taken to be 1 week. We set the discount factor  = 0:991=12, implying a
yearly discount rate of 4%. Following Shimer (2005), labor productivity zt is taken to mean real
output per person in the non-farm business sector. This measure of productivity is taken from the data
constructed by the BLS and the parameters for the shock process are estimated, at the weekly level, to
be  = 0:9895 and " = 0:0034. The job separation parameter  is set to 0.0081 to match the average
weekly job separation rate.3 We set k = 0:58 following Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008), who estimate
the costs of vacancy creation to be 58% of weekly labor productivity.
This leaves ve parameters to be calibrated: (1) the value h of home production; (2) the worker
bargaining weight ; (3) the matching function parameter ; (4) the level coecient of the search cost
function A; and (5) the curvature parameter of the search cost function  . We jointly calibrate these
ve parameters to simultaneously match ve data targets: (1) the average vacancy-unemployment
ratio; (2) the standard deviation of vacancy-unemployment ratio; (3) the average weekly job-nding
rate; (4) the average duration of unemployment; and (5) the elasticity of unemployment duration
with respect to benets. The rst four of these targets are directly measured in the data. For the
elasticity of unemployment duration with respect to benets, Ed;b, we use micro estimates reported by
Meyer (1990) and target an elasticity of 0.9. Intuitively, given the rst three parameters, the average
3See Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) on how to obtain the weekly estimates for the job nding rate and the job
separation rate from monthly data.
18unemployment duration and its elasticity with respect to benets identify the parameters A and  , since
these parameters govern the distortions in search behavior induced by benets. Table 1 below reports
the calibrated parameters. Our calibrated model is also consistent with non-targeted observations in
the data: for example, the elasticity of unemployment duration with respect to the potential duration
of benets is 0.167 in the model, consistent with the estimates reported in Mott (1985) and close to
other estimates in the literature.
Table 1: Internally Calibrated Parameters
Parameter Value Target Data Model
h Home production 0.580 Mean v=(1   L) 0.634 0.634
 Bargaining power 0.114 St. dev of ln(v=(1   L)) 0.259 0.259
 Matching parameter 0.492 Mean job nding rate 0.139 0.139
A Disutility of search 0.0015 Unemployment duration 13.2 13.2
  Search cost curvature 3.786 Ed;b 0.9 0.9
5 Results
In order to illustrate the mechanism behind the optimal policy, in Figure 1 we plot the optimal benet
policy function bt (z;1   Lt 1;Dt 1;et 1;t 1;t 1;t 1) as a function of current z and last period's
1   L only, keeping Dt 1, et 1, t 1, t 1 and t 1 xed at their average values. The optimal benet
level is decreasing in current productivity z and decreasing in unemployment 1 L. The intuition for this
result is that the optimal benet is lower in states of the world when the marginal social benet of job
creation is higher, because lower benets are used to encourage search eort by workers and vacancy
creation by rms. The marginal social benet of job creation is higher when z is higher, since the
output of an additional worker-rm pair is then higher. The marginal social benet is also higher when
current employment is lower. As a consequence, optimal benets are lowest, all else equal, when current
productivity is high and current employment is low, i.e. at the beginning of an economic recovery.
Figure 2 illustrates the same result for the optimal duration of benets: optimal benet duration is
lowest at times of high productivity and high unemployment. This shape of the policy function also
implies that during a recession, there are two opposing forces at work - low productivity and high
19unemployment - which give opposite prescriptions for the response of optimal benets. This gives an
ambiguous prediction for the overall cyclicality of benet levels and benet duration.
In order to understand the overall behavior of the optimal policy, in Figures 3 and 4 we analyze
the response of the economy to a negative productivity shock under the optimal policy and compare it
to the response under the current policy. In Figure 3 we plot the response of the optimal policy when
productivity drops by 2.3% after a long sequence of productivity held at 1. The optimal benet level
initially jumps up, but then falls for about two quarters following the shock, and slowly reverts to its
pre-shock level. The same is true of optimal benet duration. Unemployment rises in response to the
drop in productivity and continues rising for about one quarter before it starts to return to its pre-shock
level. Note that the rise in unemployment is signicantly lower than under the current benet policy.
In Figure 4 we plot the response of other key labor market variables. As compared to the current
benet policy, the optimal policy results in a faster recovery of the vacancy-unemployment ratio, the
search intensity of unemployed workers eligible for benets, and the job nding rate. Wages also fall
more gradually under the optimal policy than they do under the current policy.
The intuition for this optimal policy response is that the government would like to provide immediate
insurance against the negative shock and, expecting future productivity to rise, would like to induce a
recovery in vacancy creation and search eort. Thus, benet generosity responds positively to the initial
drop in productivity but negatively to the subsequent rise in unemployment, precisely as implied by
Figures 1 and 2. The initial rise in benets smooths the fall in wages through an increase in the worker
outside option. The subsequent benet decline, as well as the increase in the rate of benet expiration,
ameliorates the rise in unemployment. The government optimally uses a combination of both available
policy instruments - benet level and benet duration - to achieve this eect.
We next investigate how the economy behaves over time under the optimal policy. To this end,
we simulated the model both under the current benet policy and under the optimal policy. Table
2 reports the summary statistics, under the optimal policy, for the behavior of unemployment benet
20levels b and potential benet duration 1=e. Benets are higher and expire faster under the optimal
policy than under the current policy. The optimal tax rate under the optimal policy is  = 0:018, lower
than under the current policy.
The key observation is that, over a long period of time, the correlation of optimal benets with
productivity is positive: both benet levels and potential bent duration are pro-cyclical in the long
run and, in particular, negatively correlated with the unemployment rate. Moreover, this result is not
driven by any balanced budget requirement, since we allow the government to run decits in recessions.
Tables 3 and 4 report the moments of key labor market variables when the model is simulated
under the current policy and the optimal policy, respectively. As compared to the optimal policy, the
optimal policy results in lower average unemployment and lower unemployment volatility. These results
corroborate our earlier intuition that the benet policy serves to smooth the cyclical uctuations in
unemployment.
Finally, we compute the expected welfare gain from switching from the current policy to the optimal
policy. We nd that implementing the optimal policy results in a signicant welfare gain: 0.67% as
measured in consumption equivalent variation terms.
6 Discussion
6.1 The importance of the wage setting mechanism
The assumption of Nash bargaining in our model is an important modeling choice. Our wage-setting
mechanism is exible enough to allow wages to respond to both economic conditions - including pro-
ductivity, labor market tightness, and the worker value of home production - and government policy,
such as benets and taxes. Empirical evidence indicates that increases in unemployment benets do not
leave wages unaected, since they raise workers' reservation wages (see e.g. Fishe (1982) and Feldstein
and Poterba (1984)). This highlights the importance of a wage setting mechanism in which wages do
react to the worker outside option.
This wage setting mechanism distinguishes our paper from the concurrent work by Landais, Michail-
21lat, and Saez (2010), who assume that wages are a reduced-form function of productivity only, and thus
completely invariant to all policy changes and labor market tightness. As a result of their assumption,
the main driver of unemployment in their model is job rationing, which does not respond to changes
in policy. Consequently, in the model of Landais, Michaillat, and Saez (2010), in recessions the un-
employment rate is high but cannot be aected through UI benet policy. Not surprisingly, they nd
that optimal UI benets should be countercyclical: in recessions, unemployment benets do provide
insurance to agents against heightened unemployment risk, but do not have a substantial eect on the
unemployment rate. By contrast, in our paper, the UI benet policy aects the unemployment rate
signicantly and can be used to manipulate both worker search behavior and rm vacancy posting
behavior; in particular, it can be used to stimulate a recovery of employment during recessions. We nd
that this use of the UI benets is an integral part of the optimal policy, and optimal benets should
therefore be pro-cyclical.
6.2 The Hosios condition and its relationship to our model
An important concern in the Pissarides model with Nash bargaining is that the laissez-faire equilibrium
is not constrained ecient. Even with risk-neutral workers, the Hosios (1990) condition requires that
the worker bargaining weight be equal to the elasticity of the matching function in order to attain
eciency. If the Hosios condition is violated, there is a role for government intervention - such as
unemployment benets - even in the absence of insurance considerations. This raises the question to
what extent our optimal policy results are driven by violations of the Hosios condition, as opposed
to insurance-incentives tradeos considered in the optimal UI literature. To investigate this question,
we have solved for the optimal policy in a version of the model with risk-neutral workers, in which
the violation of the Hosios condition is the only reason for government intervention. We nd that the
cyclicality of optimal benets depends crucially on whether the worker bargaining weight is too high
or too low: optimal benets should be pro-cyclical for small values of worker bargaining power, but
countercyclical for large values. However, with risk-averse workers, we nd that optimal benets should
22be pro-cyclical both for extremely low and for extremely high values of worker bargaining power. This
implies that the violation of the Hosios condition is not the driving force of our results.4
6.3 The complementarity of benet level and benet duration
An important aspect of our analysis is the simultaneous treatment of optimal benet level and optimal
benet duration. Our results indicate that optimal benet levels and optimal benet duration move in
the same direction in response to a productivity shock, and therefore operate as complements over the
business cycle. To further emphasize this complementarity, we illustrate how the optimal policy would
change if the government were restricted to change only one of these two policy dimensions. This may
be relevant, for example, because benet duration may be more exible in practice than the benet
level. This also facilitates comparison to the existing policy, in which mostly the duration of benets,
rather than the level, changes over the business cycle. We conduct three alternative policy experiments.
In the rst, we x the benet level at its current level: b = 0:4, and allow only the duration to change
over the business cycle. The results, reported in Figure 5, show that the optimal policy response is
similar qualitatively to our benchmark: in response to a negative productivity shock, potential duration
of benets should initially rise, and then fall considerably below its initial level. However, both the
initial rise in the potential duration and its subsequent decline are greater than in the benchmark
optimal policy result. In the second experiment, we x the benet expiration rate at its current level
of e = 1=26 and compute the optimal benet policy. Finally, in the third experiment, we ask how the
benet level should vary if benets are not allowed to expire at all, i.e. if we x e = 0. The results
are shown in Figures 6 and 7 We nd that the shape of the policy response is once again similar to
the benchmark: benets initially rise and then fall. However, both the initial rise and the subsequent
decline are greater in magnitude than in the benchmark optimal policy experiment. In each of these
cases, the government has one policy instrument at its disposal rather than two, and the optimal cyclical
4As an extension, it would be interesting to investigate optimal policy under alternative modeling of the wage process,
in particular directed search. It is well known that, while in a directed search model with risk neutral workers, the laissez-
faire equilibrium is constrained ecient, this is no longer the case in a model with risk-averse workers (see e.g. Acemoglu
and Shimer (1999)) and a role for unemployment benets therefore exists. We conjecture that our results would still be
valid in a directed search model.
23response of this policy instrument becomes stronger as a result.
6.4 Sensitivity analysis
We examine the robustness of our results to the parameterization of the model. We have calibrated
the model parameters - in particular, the value of home production and the worker bargaining power -
to make the model's behavior consistent with US labor market volatility data. However, since several
alternative calibrations exist in the literature (see e.g. Shimer (2005)), we conduct sensitivity analysis to
determine whether our optimal policy results remain valid under these alternative calibrations. Figure 8
displays the optimal policy results when home production is set to 0. Because the value of unemployment
is considerably lower under this calibration, the optimal policy prescribes for benets not to expire at
all, but the optimal response of the benet level is similar to our benchmark. Figure 9 displays the
results when worker bargaining power is increased to 0.5. Next, we adopt the Shimer (2005) calibration,
in which we set home production to 0 and the bargaining power of the workers to 0.72. The result is
displayed in Figure 10; once again, optimal benets do not expire, but the optimal response of the
benet level is the same as in our benchmark. The main qualitative features of our results, including
the result that the optimal benet scheme is pro-cyclical, do not depend on which calibration is used.
In addition, we have computed the optimal policy for dierent values of worker risk aversion: specically,
we have computed it for constant relative risk aversion utility, for values of relative risk aversion equal
to 1=2 and 2. The results are displayed in Figures 11 and 12. Once again, the qualitative features of
our results remain intact.
7 Conclusion
We analyzed the design of an optimal UI system in the presence of aggregate shocks in an equilibrium
search and matching model. Optimal benets respond non-monotonically to productivity shocks: while
raising benet generosity may be optimal at the onset of a recession, it becomes suboptimal as the
recession progresses and inducing a recovery is desirable. We nd that optimal benets are pro-cyclical
24overall, counter to previous results in the literature. Adopting the optimal policy would yield signicant
welfare gains. Furthermore, we nd that the optimal benet policy, in addition to providing insurance
to workers, results in the smoothing of unemployment over the business cycle.
An important extension for future research is investigating the role of government commitment. The
ability of the government to commit matters because the behavior of agents in our model depends not
only on the current policy, but also on their expectations about future policy. Throughout the paper, we
have assumed that the government can fully commit to its policy. A government without commitment
power might be tempted not to lower benets when there are a lot of unemployed workers. It would
therefore be interesting to characterize the time-consistent policy and compare it to the optimal policy
in the presence of aggregate shocks.
Our paper has focused on the optimal cyclical behavior of UI benets and thus serves to inform the
ongoing policy debate on the desirability of benet extensions in recessions. UI benets are a worker-
side intervention, as they aect the economy by changing the workers' value of being unemployed. An
interesting extension would be to consider the optimal behavior of UI benets in conjunction with rm-
side interventions, such as hiring subsidies. Increasing hiring subsidies in recessions may be desirable as
another instrument for stimulating an employment recovery. A potential concern with hiring subsidies,
frequently articulated in policy debates, is the rm-side moral hazard they generate: rms could, for
example, re existing employees only to hire them again in order to receive hiring subsidies. A thorough
investigation of the tradeos involved with such policies seems a fruitful direction for future research.
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27A Solving for the Optimal Policy





































































be the probability of history zt = fz0;z1;:::;ztg given the initial condition z 1. Denote by 






































respectively. In what follows, we suppress the dependence on zt for notational simplicity. The rst
order necessary conditions with respect to bt;et;wt;SE
t ;SI
t ;Lt;Dt;t, respectively, are:
(Dt   (1   et)t)u0 (h + bt) = Dt (32)
Dt [u(h + bt)   u(h + p)   bt   t] = t (1   et)
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g = 0 (40)
To nd the optimal policy given  and , we solve the above system of dierence equations (32)-(39)



















































We then pick  and  so that (4) and (40) are satised.
Observe that the only period-t   1 variables that enter the period-t rst-order conditions are
Lt 1;Dt 1;et 1;t 1;t 1;t 1;
and no variables from periods prior to t   1 enter the period-t rst-order conditions. This implies that
(zt;Lt 1;Dt 1;et 1;t 1;t 1;t 1) is a sucient state variable for the history of shocks zt up to and
including period t. Specically, x ;, and let ( ) and (+) denote the previous period's variable and
the next period's variable, respectively. Let




be a function that satises
(D   (1   e))u0 (h + b) = D (41)
D[u(h + b)   u(h + p)   b   ] = (1   e)
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SE
(53)

























satises the system (32)-(39) and (2), (3), (14). (15),(16),(17).
To nd the optimal policy given , we therefore solve the system of functional equations (41)-(53).
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32Table 2: Optimal benet behavior
Benet level Potential duration
b 1=e
Mean 0.472 12.5
Standard deviation 0.010 0.059
Correlation with z 0.758 0.520
Correlation with 1   L -0.420 -0.136
Correlation with b 1 0.950
Table 3: Model statistics simulated under the current US policy
z 1   L v=(1   L) ^ f w SE SI
Mean 1 0.059 0.634 0.139 0.954 0.505 0.655
Standard Deviation 0.013 0.128 0.259 0.150 0.010 0.040 0.003
z 1 -0.849 0.907 0.945 0.883 0.873 0.943
1   L - 1 -0.902 -0.723 -0.908 -0.916 -0.891
v=(1   L) - - 1 0.775 0.996 0.987 0.959
Correlation ^ f - - - 1 0.742 0.731 0.861
Matrix w - - - - 1 0.997 0.958
SE - - - - - 1 0.960
SI - - - - - - 1
Note: Means are reported in levels, standard deviations and correlations
are reported in logs as quarterly deviations from an HP-ltered trend with a
smoothing parameter of 1600. ^ f denotes the weekly job nding rate.
Table 4: Model statistics simulated under the optimal US policy
z 1   L v=(1   L) ^ f w SE SI
Mean 1 0.049 0.742 0.157 0.956 0.520 0.655
Standard Deviation 0.13 0.027 0.062 0.032 0.011 0.008 0.003
z 1 -0.877 0.814 0.775 0.917 0.743 0.995
1   L - 1 -0.934 -0.920 -0.656 -0.904 -0.847
v=(1   L) - - 1 0.998 0.515 0.993 0.768
Correlation ^ f - - - 1 0.459 0.999 0.726
Matrix w - - - - 1 0.416 0.942
SE - - - - - 1 0.692
SI - - - - - - 1
Note: Means are reported in levels, standard deviations and correlations
are reported in logs as quarterly deviations from an HP-ltered trend with a
smoothing parameter of 1600. ^ f denotes the weekly job nding rate.
33Figure 3: Responses to 2.3% drop in productivity
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34Figure 4: Responses to 2.3% drop in productivity




















































35Figure 5: Response of duration to a 2.3% shock, xing benet level at b = 0:4
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36Figure 6: Response of benet level to a 2.3% shock, xing expected duration at 26 weeks


























37Figure 7: Response of benet level to a 2.3% shock with no benet expiration




























38Figure 8: Response to a 2.3% shock with h = 0


























39Figure 9: Response to a 2.3% shock with  = 0:5
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40Figure 10: Response to a 2.3% shock under Shimer (2005) calibration



























41Figure 11: Response to a 2.3% shock under risk aversion of  = 1=2
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42Figure 12: Response to a 2.3% shock under risk aversion of  = 2
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